capitalist social formation may be better represented as an articulation of the liberal democratic state and capitalist production, in which the dynamics of the whole cannot be reduced to the structure of either. Further, under general historical conditions, this articulation renders the social whole a contradictory rather than a functional totality. Thus, liberal democratic capitalism consists of the social relations of capitalist production, the social relations of liberal democracy, and the structure of their articulation.3 3 The current articulation, forged through social struggles spawned by the general crisis of the 1930s, has quite fundamentally altered the accumulation process, affecting both the character of distributional struggles and the mechanisms of crisis management and resolution. Although this articulation has been a critical element in the reproduction of class relations since World War II, it remains contradictory and, under current conditions, has contributed substantially to the persistence of relative economic stagnation and inflation.4
The juxtaposition of liberal democracy and capitalism itself introduces a contradictory element into the reproduction of the social relations of production, because of the discrepant forms of political participation supported by each. Capitalism structures practices through rights in property, to be exercised by owners or their representatives, while liberal democracy vests rights in persons, formally independent from ownership. As a consequence, popular struggles in liberal democratic capitalist societies typically attempt to apply the rules of the game based on person rights to contests within the sphere of capitalist production, where their application directly confronts and contests the power of capitals Capital, conversely, has More subtle, perhaps, but no less important, have been the resulting changes in the way the reserve army of the unemployed works to restore profitability by minimizing wage increases. In recent years the combined effects of the structure of collective bargaining agreements, the institutionalization of countercyclical economic policy, and the expansion of the citizen wage appear to have greatly reduced the negative impact of ~ the reserve army on money wages. This greatly interferes with the ability of capital to restore its power over labor through the normal workings of the business cycle.
Throughout the early and mid-1970s, the various forms of popular access to the liberal democratic state enabled the working class to effectively thwart capital's attempts to pass on the burdens of increasingly adverse international economic conditions, the growing institutional irrationality of market allocations, and real scarcities, stemming from reduced access to natural resources.7 The result has 6. The struggle to transport rights vested in persons to the economy was of course taken up with a vengeance in the 1960s and 1970s by other popular groups, such as blacks, women, and the elderly.
7. According to Weisskopf, the long-term decline in the before-tax profit rate may be largely attributed to the decline in terms of trade. See Thomas Weisskopf, "Marxian Crisis Theory and the Rate of Profit in the Postwar U. S. Economy," Cambridge Journal of Economics, voL 5, no. 4 (December 1979) . In the third section we develop an integrated theory of the articulation of the state and the accumulation process that speaks to these novel conditions. The fourth section describes the specific conditions underlying the joint viability of capitalist growth and liberal democracy in the post-World War Il era. During the long postwar boom, the evolution of state policy and class relations significantly altered the relationship between capital and wage labor, in a manner intimately connected to the liberal democratic structure of the state. In this section, we introduce the concept of the capital-labor accord and explore its institutional development in the U. S. ' . In the fifth section, we present evidence on the distributional consequences of the accord, namely, a decline in the share of total output available to capital due largely to the gradual increase in the share consumed by workers in the form of both market and stateprovided goods and services. Contrary to widely held &dquo;wage squeeze&dquo; interpretations of the current crisis, there appears to be no long-term trend toward an increase in the before-tax ratio of wages to profits. These data thus strongly suggest the integral and direct role of the state in the current crisis.
The sixth section explores the effects of the accord on how the crisis itself provides the conditions for the resumption of the accumulation process, and the final section integrates these propositions with a general interpretation of economic crisis and inflation. We after-tax receipts from the sale of labor power. Table 6 Capital's Share of Total Output Notes:
a Equals one minus the share of workers' total consumption (from Table 5 ). (money) or real (inflation corrected) wages. First, the rate of wage increase xt any given level of unemployment may increase. This is represented in the accompanying figure by a'shift from the presumed existing relationship ww to a hypothetical new relationship w ~ w ~ . Second, the effect of a change in the unemployment rate upon the rate of increase in wages may be reduced. This is indicated by the shift from ww to w I w 1 1. We find that both shifts have taken place, at least in the case of nominal wages, which is represented by a shift from ww to w*w*: not only is a given level of the unemployment rate associated with higher rates of wage increase, but the depressing effect on wages of a given increase in the unemployment rate is less powerful.
On this point there can be little doubt. The usual negative relationship between unemployment and wage increases has been weakened. doubt that the decreasing capability of the reserve army to curb moneywage increases has been compensated for by a shift in labor productivity. The result is that the use of periodic unemployment to restore capital's power over labor has fundamentally changed.
The familiar cyclical pattern persists; the reserve army has not been banished, but its effects have been weakened. It is striking that an alteration of such decisive importance to the accumulation process is so poorly understood. The increasing insulation of the working class from the reserve army cannot be related to the growth of trade unions, for the relative numerical importance and probably the economic and political strength of the labor-union movement have been in decline, not ascendancy, during almost the entire postwar boom Nonetheless it may well be that the increase in the length of the typical collective-bargaining agreement-an integral part of the evolution of hierarchical and economistic unionism-has effectively shielded signifisuggests that a general attenuation of the reserve army's effect did take place, even accounting for the increase in the rate of inflation. We have performed another test, one that appears to be less sensitive to the particular data and methods used: we have eliminated the upward trend in money wages by comparing the rate of nominal wage increase in the trough years with the average of the two adjacent peaks (preceding and succeeding). The percentage point decline (-) or increase (+) associated with the contraction calculated in this manner is as follows: 1949, -5.7; 1954, -3.3; 1958, -1.0; 1961, -1.6; 1971, -0.8; 1975 (1949-50; 1974, 1978) , this index has doubled over the postwar period. Our data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1979) and the President's Council of Economic Advisors (1979 
